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CIVIL RIGHTS -EDUCATION:
DO VIOLATIONS OF THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS
AND PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (FERPA) CREATE AN ENFORCE-
ABLE RIGHT UNDER THE MEANING OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Gonzaga University v. John Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)
I. FACTS
In October of 1993 John Doe was a student in Gonzaga University's
Department of Education.' He had planned to teach in the State of
Washington upon graduation from Gonzaga, as he had submitted an appli-
cation to the state seeking teacher certification.2 In addition to submitting
an application for teacher certification in Washington, he also had to submit
an affidavit from the dean of the Education Department that would support
his good moral character. 3 Roberta League, Gonzaga's teaching certificate
specialist, overheard a student's conversation on October 5, 1993, that dealt
with another student at Gonzaga, Jane Doe, who had been physically in-
jured as a result of the actions of John Doe.4 League, after recognizing that
John Doe was a student in the Department of Education and currently was a
student teacher, discussed the conversation with the director of field exper-
ience for student teachers at Gonzaga, and then decided to investigate the
situation further.5 League's investigation consisted of speaking to the stu-
dent whom she had overheard talking about Jane Doe, and making various
attempts to get Jane Doe to come forward about the date rape allegations. 6
League also contacted a senior investigator with the Office of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI), which regulates teacher edu-
1. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 992 P.2d 545, 549 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
2. Id. at 549-50.
3. Id. The dean would have to certify, under penalty of perjury, that, "several faculty
members have been contacted who personally know or knew _ , who is a candidate for
certification. They have no knowledge... that the applicant has been convicted of any crime or
has a history of any serious behavioral problems." Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 393 n.3
(Wash. 2001).
4. Doe, 992 P.2d at 549. League overheard that Jane Doe's injuries consisted of obvious
physical pain that was a result of having sex with John Doe. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 550-5 1. Both the student who League initially overheard talking about Jane Doe and
the director of field experience for student teachers talked with Jane Doe about making a formal
statement about the sexual allegations, but Jane Doe refused to make such a statement and instead
said "I guess I don't really know what rape is,' and, 'I promised [John Doe] I wouldn't tell. He
made me promise."' Id. at 550.
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cation programs, to inform her that a teacher education student, John Doe,
"had possibly date raped another student." 7  League, in subsequent
conversations with OSPI, identified John Doe by name.8
In March 1994, John Doe was told in a letter from the Dean of the
Department of Education, that the dean would not give Doe the moral
character affidavit from Gonzaga "in light of allegations of sexual assault."9
John Doe was not provided any information as to what the sexual assault
allegations were, or who had actually made such allegations.10 When John
Doe and his parents asked Gonzaga about their possible appeal rights in
relation to the dean's refusal to submit the affidavit of moral character,
"they were told there were none."lI
John Doe then sued Gonzaga and Roberta League in state court for
violations of tort and contract law, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
releasing his personal information without his consent to an unauthorized
person in violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974 (FERPA).12 After a trial in Spokane County Superior Court, the jury
ruled in favor of John Doe on every count, which resulted in a total award
of $1,155,000, which included $150,000 in compensatory damages and
$300,000 in punitive damages for the FERPA claim.13
At the trial, Gonzaga made a motion for judgment as a matter of law on
John Doe's FERPA claim, which raised the issue that there was no right or
privilege under § 1983 created by FERPA.14 Gonzaga also argued that its
conduct, the release of John Doe's personally identifiable information to an
unauthorized person without John Doe's consent, was not done under the
color of state law.15 The trial court denied Gonzaga's motions, so it
appealed both the judgment and the denial of its motions. 16
The Court of Appeals of Washington found that the trial court erred by
not granting a directed verdict to Gonzaga on the § 1983 claim.17 The court
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Brief for Respondent at 3, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (No. 01-679).
10. Id. at 3, 5.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 277, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002).
13. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 396 (Wash. 2001). The complete breakdown of the
jury verdict provided $500,000 on the defamation count, $55,000 on the breach of educational
contract count, $50,000 on the negligence count, $450,000 on the FERPA count, and $100,000 on
the invasion of privacy count. Id.
14. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (No. 0 1-679).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Doe, 992 P.2d at 555. The court of appeals also held that Gonzaga was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Doe's claims for invasion of privacy, negligence, and breach of
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held that FERPA did "not create any right or privilege that private
individuals can enforce under § 1983."18 FERPA was viewed as legislation
that required a system-wide plan be in place at participating schools, rather
than a law that attempted to ensure that "the needs of any particular person
have been satisfied." 19
The Washington Supreme Court granted John Doe's petition for
review, and it reversed in part and affirmed in part the court of appeals'
holding. 20 The supreme court sustained the jury's verdict on the FERPA
claim, and the judgment was reinstated. 21 The court also held that FERPA
itself may not give rise to a private cause of action, but John Doe did not
have to allege a private cause of action under FERPA to bring a § 1983
claim. 22 The court recognized that Doe had asserted the FERPA violation
itself as the grounds for his § 1983 claim, "which provides a remedy for
violation of federally conferred rights." 23 Then the court applied the test set
forth by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether the
statutory provisions of FERPA that were violated gave rise to a privately
enforceable federal right.24 After deciding that the FERPA provision in
question passed the test and provided a privately enforceable right under §
1983, the court concluded there was "substantial evidence to support the
jury finding that the trial defendants deprived [John Doe] of his federal
statutory right under FERPA."25
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "whether
a student may sue a private university for damages under Rev. Stat. § 1979,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 ed., Supp. V), to enforce provisions of the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974."26 As the supreme court and
court of appeals in Washington, as well as other federal courts have divided
on this issue, the United States Supreme Court decided to resolve the con-
flict between these lower courts and clarify "any ambiguity in [its] own
educational contract. Id. at 549. Doe's defamation claim was remanded for a new trial as some of
the trial court's evidentiary rulings were reversed. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 556 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 343 (1997).
20. Doe, 24 P.3d at 393.
21. Id. The defamation, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract jury verdicts were also
sustained and their judgments reinstated, but the negligence claim was dismissed. Id.
22. Id. at 400.
23. Id. (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990)).
24. Id; see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
25. Respondent's Brief at 7, Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (No. 01-679).
The Washington Supreme Court also found that substantial evidence existed that Gonzaga acted
under the color of state law, another requirement necessary to bring an action under a § 1983
claim. Id. The issue of whether Gonzaga acted under the color of state law was not granted
certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. 122 S.Ct. 865 (Mem) (2002).
26. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2271 (2002).
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opinions."27 The Court held that one could bring a § 1983 action against
state actors in an effort to enforce rights that are created by federal statutes,
but spending legislation that is drafted in the style of FERPA did not confer
enforceable rights, and therefore did not allow one to seek a remedy under §
1983.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL AND PRIVACY RIGHTS ACT OF 1974
(FERPA)
FERPA conditions the receipt of federal funds under the programs of
the Department of Education on educational institutions' compliance with
FERPA's provisions that pertain to the procedures regarding the handling
and keeping of educational records. 29 Congress enacted FERPA to protect
the privacy of students and their parents by allowing parents access to their
child's educational records, and by preventing the release of a student's
educational record to third parties without the parents' consent. 30
Educational institutions must follow the conditions relating to access and
disclosure of a student's educational records, or the Secretary of Education,
acting under the spending power of Congress, can withhold federal funds
from that institution.3 1
27. Id. at 2272. The Supreme Court determined that since all of these courts based their
decisions on the same Supreme Court opinions, the Court decided that its "opinions in this area
may not be models of clarity." Id.
28. Id. at 2273; see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 (1980) (allowing § 1983 claims to
be brought against state and local officials that are based on federal statutory rights).
29. John E. Theuman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) (20 U.S.C.A. §1232g), 112 A.L.R. FED. 1,
§ 2(a) (1993). FERPA is often referred to as the Buckley Amendment, as Senator Buckley was a
chief sponsor of the legislation. Id.
30. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. The most relevant provision of FERPA as discussed in the Court's
majority opinion in Gonzaga v. Doe states:
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational
agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records (or personally identifiable information contained therein other than
directory information, as defined in paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of this section) of
students without the written consent of their parents to any individual, agency, or
organization, other than to the following.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(l)(2002).
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens would also consider the following provisions:
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or
institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students
who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case
may be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children. If any material or
document in the education record of a student includes information on more than one student, the
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FERPA defines an educational record as documents, files, records, or
other materials which "contain information directly related to a student; and
are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting
for such agency or institution." 32 FERPA states that an educational record
does not include records of instructional and administrative personnel,
which are still in the sole possession of the person who created the record
and have not been revealed to any other person except a substitute. 33
Records maintained by the law enforcement unit of the educational
institution, which were created for the purpose of law enforcement, are also
not considered educational records. 34
If a parent or student believes a violation under FERPA has occurred,
that student must file a written complaint with the United States Secretary
of Education. 35 The Secretary of Education, under the power granted to
him or her under FERPA, has an office designated within the department,
the Family Policy Compliance Office (Office), to "investigate, process, and
review complaints and violations under the Act."36 The Office also
"[p]rovide[s] technical assistance to ensure compliance with the Act."37 If
the Office determines that an educational institution has not complied with
FERPA, the Office must give that institution a statement containing specific
parents of one of such students shall have the right to inspect and review only such part of such
material or document as relates to such student or to be informed of the specific information
contained in such part of such material. Each educational agency or institution shall establish
appropriate procedures for the granting of a request by parents for access to the education records
of their children within a reasonable period of time, but in no case more than forty-five days after
the request has been made.
Gonzaga 536 U.S. at_, 122 S.Ct. at 2281 n.l citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A).
No funds under any applicable program shall be made available to any State educational agency
(whether or not that agency is an educational agency or institution under this section) that has a
policy of denying, or effectively prevents, the parents of students the right to inspect and review
the education records maintained by the State educational agency on their children who are or
have been in attendance at any school of an educational agency or institution that is subject to the
provisions of this section.
Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at , 122 S.Ct. at 2281 n.1. citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(B).
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
33. Id. at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B).
34. Id. at § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii). FERPA also does not consider records for students, over the
age of eighteen or attending a postsecondary educational institution, that are created and
maintained by a recognized medical professional to be an education record, "except that such
records can be personally reviewed by a physician or other appropriate professional of the
student's choice." Id. at § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv). Records for employees at an educational
institution for persons who are employed by that institution, but are not attending the institution
are not education records so long as they relate to that person's capacity as an employee. Id. at §
1232g(a)(4)(B)(iii).
35. 34 C.F.R. § 99.63; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g)(2002).
36. 34 C.F.R. § 99.60; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 99.60; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g). The Secretary also designates the
Office of Administrative Law Judges to be the Review Board that is mandated under the Act
(FERPA) to enforce the Act with respect to all applicable programs. 34 C.F.R. § 99.60.
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steps the institution must follow in order to comply with FERPA.38 An
institution not complying with FERPA would then be given a reasonable
period of time to allow the institution to comply voluntarily with FERPA.39
If, after a reasonable period of time, the educational institution does not
then voluntarily comply with FERPA, the Secretary may either withhold
further payments under any applicable program and obtain a cease and de-
sist order to compel the institution to comply, or terminate the institution's
eligibility to receive federal funding under any applicable program. 40
B. UTILIZING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C § 1983
TO ENFORCE PURELY STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW:
THE EARLY CASES.
In Maine v. Thiboutot,41 the Court held for the first time that a § 1983
action may be brought against state actors in an effort to enforce rights that
were created by federal statutes. 42 In Thiboutot, the plaintiffs were a hus-
band and wife, Lionel Thiboutot and Joline Thiboutot respectively, who had
a total of eight children, of which three were Lionel's from a previous mar-
riage. 43 Lionel had been receiving welfare benefits based on all eight
children under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),44 part of
the federal Social Security Act.a5 When the Department of Human Services
for the State of Maine changed the way the state administered benefits un-
der AFDC, Lionel was then entitled to benefits under AFDC for only the
three children that were exclusively his, even though he was legally
responsible for the other five children as well.46
The Thiboutots unsuccessfully challenged Maine's interpretation of
AFDC before the state's administrative agencies before seeking relief under
§ 1983 "for themselves and others similarly situated" in the state superior
38. 34 C.F.R. § 99.66. After conducting an investigation the Office must provide both the
complainant and the institution with the basis for its findings. Id. If the Office does not find that
an educational institution violated FERPA after having received a complaint to that effect, the
complainant and institution would still both receive notice of the Office's finding and the basis for
its finding. Id.
39. Id. A reasonable amount of time to comply with FERPA is determined by the
circumstances of the case. Id.
40. 34 C.F.R. § 99.67; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f) (2002).
41. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
42. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
43. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3.
44. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1980).




court.47 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the superior court's
decision in favor of the Thiboutots.48 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide, "whether § 1983 encompasses claims based on
purely statutory violations of federal law. .. "49
Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of a State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress .... 50
The Court had to answer whether the word "laws," as found in § 1983,
should be limited to a subset of laws or whether it literally meant all federal
laws.5 ' The Court concluded that because the statute, § 1983, was written
in such plain language and Congress did not attach any modifiers to the
phrase that included "laws," the statute encompassed Thiboutot's claim that
Maine violated the Social Security Act.52
The Court also stated that even if one found § 1983 ambiguous as to
whether it should apply to spending legislation, the Court had already
decided cases that suggested the § 1983 remedy broadly included violations
of federal statutory law.53 For example, Justice Stone in Hague v. Comm.
for Indus. Org.,5 4 wrote that "§ 1983 was the product of an 'exten[sion] to
include rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the laws of the United
States as well as the Constitution." 55 In another previously decided case,
the Court stated that a suit in federal court under § 1983 is proper to secure
compliance by participating states with the provisions of the Social Security
47. Id. The superior court enjoined the state from enforcing the new interpretation of AFDC,
and required the state to adopt new regulations, pay the Tiboutots the correct amounts
retroactively, and notify those similarly situated of the new regulations. Id. The superior court
denied the Thiboutot's motion to be entitled to attorney's fees. Id.
48. Id. at 3-4. The Maine Supreme Court reversed the decision of the superior court in part
by allowing the Thiboutots to be eligible to recover attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. Id. at.
49. Id. The court also addressed the question that if one could recover under a § 1983 claim,
could that plaintiff also recover attorney's fees under § 1988? Id at 4.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
51. Thiboutot, 448 U.S at 4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
55. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5 (citing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. at 525-526).
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Act.56 The Court concluded that § 1983 should not be read as limited to
civil rights or equal protection laws.57 Thus the Court held that § 1983
created a cause of action for deprivations of any federal statutory right.58
In 1981, less than a year after Thiboutot was decided, Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman59 afforded the Supreme Court the chance
to discuss factors that could prevent one from bringing a § 1983 action for
state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions. 60 The parties in
Pennhurst did not raise the issue of a § 1983 action, but the Court decided
to briefly discuss what would prevent a § 1983 action in light of its recent
decision in Thiboutot.61 Before the decision in Thiboutot, the typical re-
medy for a state's noncompliance with federally imposed conditions in
legislation enacted under Congress's spending power would not be a private
cause of action for noncompliance. 62 Instead, the remedy would be an
action by the federal government to terminate funds to the State. 63 The
Pennhurst Court purported that one could bring an action under § 1983 for
violations of rights that were secured by the federal laws of the United
States based upon two factors. 64 The first factor that the plaintiff must
show is that the state's noncompliance with the spending legislation in-
volved a right secured by the laws of the United States.65 The second factor
56. See id. at 4 (citing Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970)); see also Lynch v.
Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 n. 7 (1972) (stating that § 1983 was different from
its predecessor in that it had been expanded to "provide protection for rights ... secured by federal
law"); City of Greenwood v. Packwood, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966) (stating that state officers in
a § 1983 suit may be responsible for damages "not only for violations of rights conferred by
federal equal rights laws, but for violations of other constitutional and statutory rights as well.").
57. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6-7. This decision was reached not only due to the plain language
of § 1983 and past treatment of the provision, but also due to a finding that the legislative history
in regards to the phrase "and laws" does not give a definite answer as to whether there were any
limits to the laws that § 1983 would encompass. Id.
58. id. at 9.
59. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
60. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28. Pennhurst dealt with determining the scope and meaning of
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 (DDBiI). Id. at 25-26.
The complaint alleged that conditions at Pennhurst, a medical facility that housed many mentally
challenged patients who brought this action, were so poor that they denied plaintiffs due process
and equal protection under the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment among other claims.
Id. at 5. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit chose to find for the plaintiffs under an
implied cause of action to enforce the bill of rights provision of the DDBill. Id. at 10. Although
the court of appeals did not address a private right of action under § 1983, the Supreme Court
raised the idea of how one would apply a private right of action challenge to the case. Id. at 27-
28. However, the Court did not specifically analyze such a challenge, as the parties to the case did







suggested that one could not bring a § 1983 action if the allegedly violated
legislation provided an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms. 66
The first factor from Pennhurst that must be met to allow one to bring a
§ 1983 action for violation of a federal law was more clearly defined in
1990 in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n.67 The Court in Pennhurst had
stated that a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action may only do so if the statute
claimed to have been violated, created an enforceable right under § 1983.68
As the Court's decision in Pennhurst was focused on whether the statute
gave rise to an implied right of action, the Court did not specifically address
the process one must undertake to determine if spending legislation gave
rise to an enforceable right under § 1983.69 In Wilder, a three-prong test
was utilized to determine whether the Boren Amendment the plaintiff
claimed had been violated created a "federal right that was enforceable
under § 1983."70
According to the Wilder test, a provision of a federal spending
legislation statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 if; 1) the
plaintiff is one of the class of people intended to receive a benefit from the
statute; 2) the provision reflects a binding obligation on the state, not a mere
congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct, and 3) the plaintiff
asserts an interest that is not "too vague and amorphous such that it is
'beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce."'71 Using this test, the
Court found that the Boren Amendment created an enforceable right under
66. Id. This second factor was actually taken from the dissent by Justice Powell in Thiboutot.
Id.
67. 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990).
68. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.
69. See id. at 27-34. Some of what became the test to determine whether spending
legislation creates rights that are enforceable under § 1983 in Wilder came from the test for
determining whether an implied right of action exists in federal law that is discussed in Pennhurst.
See Wilder v. Virginia, 496 U.S. at 508-09. The test for determining whether a statute provides
for an implied right of action looks at four factors. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975).
Those factors are: 1) is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted;" 2) is "there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or to deny one?" 3) "is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?" 4) "is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
Id.
70. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509. The issue in Wilder was whether the Boren Amendment to the
Medicaid Act, which required "reimbursement according to rates that a 'State finds and makes
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services], are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
facilities,' was enforceable in an action pursuant to § 1983." Id. at 503 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V)).
71. Id. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (citing
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 107 S.Ct. 766, 774 (1987)).
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§ 1983.72 The decision in Wilder created the right "to have the State adopt
rates that it finds are reasonable and adequate rates to meet the costs of an
efficient and economical health care provider." 73
The majority in Wilder concluded that the first prong of the test had
been met as the plaintiffs, health care providers, were the class of persons
intended to benefit from the Boren Amendment. 74 The language of the
Amendment refers to payments to hospital services, nurse services, and
intermediate care for the mentally retarded, which are synonymous with
health care workers. 75
The second prong of the test, which required the statute to impose a
"binding obligation on the States that gives rise to enforceable rights," 76
was met, as the Court determined that the Boren Amendment utilized
mandatory rather than precatory terms.77 The Court also found that because
the state would lose its funding from noncompliance with the Boren
Amendment, even if the state complied with the rest of the Medicaid Act, a
binding obligation was imposed on the state. 78 The Court did not elaborate
on the third prong of the test, regarding the plaintiff's interest not being too
vague and amorphous, but the Court did conclude that the Boren
Amendment met the test and created an enforceable right under § 1983. 79
The second factor from Pennhurst would not allow a plaintiff to bring a
§ 1983 action where the statute that was violated provided an exclusive
remedy for violations of its terms.80  In Middlesex County Sewerage
72. Id. at 522.
73. Id. The relevant portion of the Boren Amendment, which both the majority opinion and
dissent cite as relevant, states that the Boren Amendment requires states to reimburse Medicaid
service providers (hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an intermediate care
facility for the mentally retarded) "using 'rates (determined in accordance with methods and
standards developed by the State ... ) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to
the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently
and economically operated facilities...' Id. at 503, 522 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)
(1982 ed., Supp. V)).
74. Id. at 510.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 512. An example of such use of precatory terms would be when the amendment
says the states "must" "'provide for payment.. .of hospital[s]' according to rates that the State
finds are reasonable and adequate." Id. The reference to mandatory versus precatory terms was
from Pennhurst, which purported that if Congress spoke in precatory terms, the statute was less
likely to be what Congress intended to say. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 18 (1981).
78. Wilder v. Virginia, 496 U.S. 498, 512 (1990).
79. Id. at 523. The Court also found that the second factor from Pennhurst, which would
require Congress not to have created an exclusive remedy in a statute to proceed with a § 1983
action based on that statute was met, and the plaintiffs had a valid § 1983 action for violations of
the Boren Amendment. Id. at 519-524.
80. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.
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Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,8 1 this second factor precluded
the plaintiffs from pursuing a private action under § 1983 for violations of
two federal acts.82 The Court found that Congress had "foreclosed a § 1983
remedy" under each of the two Acts, as the remedial devices provided in the
particular Acts were so comprehensive that they demonstrated
congressional intent to preclude any remedy under § 1983.83
In Middlesex, the plaintiffs claimed the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) had been violated, but that Act conferred authority
to both government officials and private citizens to sue in response to
violations of provisions of the Act. 84 The EPA Administrator, in the event
of violations of the FWPCA, could seek damages of $10,000 per day under
civil penalties, as well as seek criminal penalties. 85 Any interested person
could also seek judicial review of certain actions that were done by the EPA
Administrator in the United States courts of appeals. 86 The other Act that
the plaintiffs in Sea Clammers claimed had been violated provided many of
the same enforcement mechanisms as the FWPCA, as well as provisions for
express citizen suits. 87 The Court could not find that Congress intended to
allow a § 1983 right of action when the Acts that were allegedly violated in
the matter provided such "comprehensive enforcement mechanisms." 88
81. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
82. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S. at 19-20. The Court raised the issue of
whether a § 1983 action may apply in this case, despite the fact the respondents did not raise it
themselves. Id. The case involved alleged damage to fishing waters due to dumping and
discharges of waste into the ocean. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiffs had sought damages based on
common law and under the provisions of two federal acts. Id.
83. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S. at 20. As the Court found the existence of
Congress' intent to foreclose a remedy under § 1983, the Court did not attempt to discover if the
Federal Acts created an enforceable right under § 1983. Id.
84. Id. at 11. The EPA Administrator was even authorized to allow the state in which the
violation occurred the option to take action before doing so himself. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1976
ed. Supp HI).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 309(d), (c) (1981).
86. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth,453 U.S. at 13-14 This review must be sought within
90 days. Id. at 14 n.23.
87. Id. The citizen suit provisions in the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972 (MPRSA), as amended 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 ed. and Supp.III), authorized private citizens
to bring actions seeking injunctions to enforce this statute. Id. The similar enforcements of the
MPRSA to the FWPCA included the assessment of both civil and criminal penalties by the
Administrator of the EPA. Id. at n.24 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1415(a), (b)).
88. Id. at 20.
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C. Two COMPETING METHODS OF DETERMINING IF A VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL SPENDING LEGISLATION CREATES AN
ENFORCEABLE RIGHT UNDER § 1983
Since Thiboutot, two exceptions emerged that would prevent a § 1983
action for violation of federal statutes. 89 These exceptions do not allow a
private right of action under § 1983 "where Congress has foreclosed such
enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did
not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning
of § 1983."90 In terms of whether Congress has foreclosed the possibility of
using § 1983 to enforce a violation of a federal statute, Sea Clammers still
provides the best example of statutes or acts that foreclosed the possibility
of a § 1983 action.91 If an Act contains remedial measures that are
'comprehensive,' a suit under § 1983 would be precluded because the
remedial measures would serve as congressional intent as to how violations
of the Act should be remedied. 92
The three-prong test used by the majority in Wilder continues to be a
viable method to determine if a provision of federal spending legislation
creates an enforceable right under § 1983.93 In Blessing v. Freestone,94 five
mothers sued the director of Arizona's child support agency under § 1983,
because they felt they had an enforceable right under certain provisions of
the Social Security Act. 95 The Court noted that the lower court had applied
the three-prong test and that this test was what the Supreme Court would
utilize to determine if a statute creates a privately enforceable right.96
An alternative approach to determine whether a § 1983 enforceable
right is created by a violation of a federal statute was used to decide the
89. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981); see also Wilder v.
Virginia, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990).
90. Suter v. Artist M. 503 U.S. 347, 355-356 (1992); see also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S.
329, 341 (1997).
91. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346-347.
92. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
93. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. The requirement of the three-prong test was as follows:
"First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so 'vague and
amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States." Id.
94. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
95. Id. at 332. The mothers felt they had an enforceable right to have Arizona's program
pertaining to child support services achieve "substantial compliance" with the requirements of a
certain provision. Id. at 332-33.
96. Id. at 338. The Supreme Court then utilized the three-prong test when it determined
whether a privately created right existed. Id. at 340-341. The case was remanded back to district
court as no right for private action was found based on the plaintiffs' specific claim, but the
possibility of enforceable rights may exist elsewhere in the statute. Id. at 347-349.
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1992 case of Suter v. Artist M .97 In Suter, the majority recognized that a §
1983 action may not be possible to enforce a violation of a federal statute
"where the statute did not create enforceable rights . . . within the meaning
of § 1983." 98 However, in Suter the Court did not use the three-prong test
to determine if a right had been created. 99
The Court, in an effort to ascertain if an enforceable right under § 1983
had been created, based its inquiry on whether Congress unambiguously
conferred a right upon the Act's beneficiaries.100 To determine if Congress
intended to create a right, the Court had to analyze the language of the
statute in question, which was a provision of the Adoption Act that required
the state to use "reasonable efforts to prevent a child from being removed
from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his family." 101
The Court sought to discover if the "reasonable efforts" language placed a
mandatory requirement on the state that rose to the level of unambiguously
conferring a right to the plaintiffs.102 The Act did place a requirement on
the state according to the Court, but the "reasonable efforts" clause required
only that the state have a plan in place to prevent a child from being
removed from his or her house.103 The "reasonable efforts" clause or other
language in the Act did not require the state to have a specific method or
procedure that would insure that the state was using "reasonable efforts" to
prevent a child from being removed from his home.' 04 No statutory
guidance was found as to how to calculate "reasonable efforts," so the
Court viewed the "reasonable efforts" language as a directive that would
seem to vary according to the situation of each case. 105
97. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
98. Suter, 503 U.S. at 355.
99. Id. at 355-358. The dissent raised the point that the majority did not use the three-
pronged test that had been utilized in Wilder just two years before. Id. at 366.
100. Id. at 357, 363. In Suter, the plaintiffs in this class action lawsuit brought the action to
obtain both declaratory and injunctive relief under the Adoption Act. Id. at 352. The plaintiffs
believed that the defendants, the Director and an administrator from the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS), violated 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988 ed., Supp. I) by
failing "to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal of children from their homes and to
facilitate reunification of families where removal had occurred." Id. at 351-52.
101. Id. at 352, 357; see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1992). The lower courts said that the
"reasonable efforts" clause created a right that was enforceable under § 1983. Id. at 353-354..
102. Id. at 357.
103. Id. at 358.
104. Id. Had the Adoption Act set forth in detail some clear factors to be considered when
determining how to prevent a child from being removed from his or her home an enforceable right
may have been created. Id. at 359-360.
105. Id. at 360. This directive given to the states that they must use "reasonable efforts,"
appeared to give each state a fairly broad limit that it could apply. Id.
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The Court also looked at the legislative history of the Act, and
determined that although Congress was concerned about the required
reasonable efforts made by the states, the Act did leave a great deal of
discretion to the states.106 Thus the Court concluded, after examining the
language and legislative history of the Act, "that the 'reasonable efforts'
language [did] not unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the
Act's beneficiaries."107
The test used in Suter was a departure from the three-prong test utilized
in Wilder.108 This new or alternative test was derived from the dissent in
Wilder, which purported that the test for determining if a statute conferred
an enforceable right under § 1983 should be the same as the test used in
implied right of action cases. 109 In essence, the holding in Suter only
allowed an enforceable right to be created under § 1983 if the Act that was
violated contained an implied right of action for private enforcement10
The test to determine if an implied right of action exists is found in Cort v.
Ash.]i1 In his dissent from Wilder, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
before Thiboutot, one had to demonstrate that a federal statute contained an
implied cause of action to enforce judicially a provision within that
statute.112 He went on to say that "[tihe [c]ourt's general practice was 'to
imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly
conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in
the case."' 1 13 Furthermore, Rehnquist concluded that when seeking a
remedy for violation of a statute either under § 1983 action or by implied
106. Id. at 362. The Court contrasted the Adoption Act language to the language found in
the Medicaid legislation found in Wilder, where an enforceable right was found. Id. at 359. The
Medicaid Act contained factors that prompted the Court to take the position that the Medicaid Act
itself placed an obligation on the states, which required them to adopt reasonable and adequate
rates. Id. There was nothing in the Adoption Act itself that placed an obligation on the state to act
in a certain way in order to be acting with "reasonable efforts." Id. at 361-362.
107. Id. at 363.
108. Id. at 365-366. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109. Wilder v.Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 525 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992).
111. Id. The factors used to determine whether an implied right for private enforcement
exists are as follows:
Those factors are: 1) is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted;" 2) is "there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or to deny one?" 3) "is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?" 4) "is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975).
112. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 525. Chief Justice Rehnquist also wrote the majority opinion in
Suter. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).




right of action, "the language used by Congress must confer identifiable
enforceable rights.","4
D, PAST DECISIONS INVOLVING § 1983 ACTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
FERPA
The existence and validity of both the three-prong Wilder test and the
Suter test has caused confusion in lower courts in terms of which test to
apply when determining if a federal statute has created an enforceable right
under § 1983.115 This confusion as to which test to apply can be seen in
§ 1983 actions that have been brought to enforce violations of FERPA.
Courts have generally determined that if either of the two factors first noted
in Pennhurst"16 exist, they would not allow a § 1983 action to be brought
for a violation of FERPA. 117 The lower courts then tend to split in terms of
what test or tests should be used to determine whether FERPA creates
rights that are enforceable within the meaning of § 1983.118 The lower
courts have generally agreed that Congress did not foreclose bringing a
§ 1983 action to enforce violations of FERPA. 119
Whether to apply the Suter implied right of action test1 20 or the three-
prong test of Wilderl12 has led the lower courts to reach different decisions
as to whether violations of FERPA are enforceable by a § 1983 action. In
Falvo v. Owasso Ind. Sch. Dist.,122 the court relied upon the three-prong test
found in Wilder, as it determined that the additional requirements of Suter
114. Id. 525-26.
115. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278, (2002).
116. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1981). The two factors that would
preclude a § 1983 action were 1) if the statute does not create rights that are enforceable within the
meaning of § 1983, and 2) if Congress has foreclosed the possibility of § 1983 action through the
enactment itself. Id.
117. See Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire Sch. Dist., 856 F.Supp. 40, 45 (D.N.H., 1994).
118. Compare Belanger, 856 F.Supp. at 44-45 (stating that the Suter test must first be
applied, and then the Wilder test must be applied) with Gundlach v. Reinstein, 924 F.Supp. 684,
692 (E.D.D. Pa. 1996) (applying only the Suter test), and Falvo, 233 F.3d at 1210-12 (applying
only the Wilder test).
119. Belanger, 856 F. Supp. at 47; contra Meury v. Eagle-Union Community Sch. Corp.,
714 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that FERPA enforcement provisions explicitly
provide that the Secretary of Education is solely responsible for enforcement, which would then
preclude a § 1983 action).
120. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992). Language in the Act must unambiguously
confer an enforceable right on the Act's beneficiaries. Id.
121. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990). "First, Congress must have
intended that the provisions in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the fight assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that
its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose
a binding obligation on the States." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-341 (1997).
122. 233 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000).
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did not apply. 23 The court in Falvo had to decide if a teacher's practice of
allowing her students to grade each others' tests, and then call out their own
grades in a class violated FERPA.124 The three-prong test of Wilder was
then applied, and the court determined a violation of FERPA had created a
right that was enforceable by a § 1983 action. 125 First, the relevant pro-
vision of FERPA § 1232g(b)(1), intended to benefit the plaintiff in the
case.126 The court found that one purpose of FERPA was to assure pro-
tection and privacy of a student's educational record, and a parent of a child
in school would definitely be the person intended to benefit from this
purpose.127 Second, the court found that FERPA provided a binding obli-
gation on the school in question, rather than a mere congressional
preference that the school behave in a particular manner.128 The court
reached this decision because FERPA does not authorize any federal fund-
ing for schools that do not comply with its provisions, which the court saw
as a clear obligation on the schools.129 Third, the court concluded that the
language of FERPA was not vague or amorphous, therefore, it was within
the competency of the judiciary to enforce. 130
However, other courts have ignored the three-prong test found in
Wilder when determining if FERPA creates an enforceable right under
§ 1983. In Gundlach v. Reinstein,131 a Pennsylvania district court stated
that the correct test to apply in a § 1983 action for violation of FERPA was
the Suter test, which required the court to determine whether Congress un-
ambiguously conferred an enforceable right upon an Act's beneficiaries. 132
The plaintiff in Gundlach, Mr. Gundlach, was a former law student who
was suing his law school under tort and contract claims.133 Gundlach also
123. Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d at 1211 n.6. Falvo was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on an unrelated issue. See Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v.
Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002). The court chose not to follow Suter, as the United States Supreme
Court had applied the three-prong Wilder test in the Blessing case that followed Suter. Falvo, 233
F.3d at 1211 n.6.
124. Falvo, 233 F.3d at 1207. The plaintiff in the case also claimed this teacher's practice
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
125. Id. at 1211-13.
126. Id. at 1211.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2002). This language was similar to statutory
language that the Supreme Court has interpreted as creating "precise requirements." Id. (citing
SurER v. ARTIST M., 503 U.S. 347, 361 n. 12 (1992)).
130. FALVO V. OWASSO INDEP. SCH. DIST., 233 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2000).
131. 924 F.Supp. 684, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
132. GUNDLACH V. REINSTEIN, 924 F. Supp. 684, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Suter, 503
U.S. at 363. The court applied the Suter test as opposed to the Wilder test, as it chose to accept its
controlling circuit court's belief that Suter should apply. Gundlach, 924 F.Supp. at 691.
133. Gundlach, 924 F. Supp. at 687-88.
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brought a § 1983 claim against the law school because he thought the
school had violated FERPA when it attached letters, which Gundlach
believed to be part of his educational record, to its answer of Gundlach's
charges.134 The court applied the Suter test to determine if Congress had
conferred upon Gundlach a right that he could enforce.135 The court
operated under the assumption that the Suter test required any obligations
by FERPA on the law school to be unambiguously expressed, so the school
would know the obligations under which it had to operate.136 The post-
Suter view would not allow one to bring a § 1983 action for a violation of
FERPA unless that plaintiff could satisfy the test used to determine if there
was an implied right of action for spending legislation.137 However, the
court never had to apply the Suter test in this case, because it recognized
that even under the Wilder test, Gundlach would not be allowed to proceed
with his § 1983 action because there was no FERPA violation.138
Perhaps the best example of confusion caused by the two tests to
determine if a statute has created a right within the meaning of § 1983 is in
Belanger v. Nashua.139 In Belanger, the New Hampshire district court tried
to combine the Suter test and the three-prong test from Wilder.140 The court
viewed the Suter test as leaving the Wilder three-prong test alone and
adding an extra threshold inquiry for cases involving federal spending
legislation.' 4 l Under this view, the court first determined whether "[t]he
language of FERPA reveal[ed] a congressional intent to impose obligations
directly on educational agencies or institutions."1 42 Having found that the
language of FERPA did impose obligations on educational institutions, it
applied what it found as the second part of the Suter test, which was to
134. Id. at 690.
135. Id. at 691. The court recognized that "[tihe First Circuit Court of Appeals has
interpreted Suter to require that courts first determine whether the Congress intended to impose
mandatory obligations on participating institutions, an inquiry that necessarily entails an
examination of 'exactly what is required' of the participating institutions by the statute." Id.
(citing Suter, 503 U.S. at 357).
136. Gundlach, 924 F. Supp. at 691.
137. Id. at 692; see also CORT v. ASH, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (stating the factors that are
relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit within a statute that does not
expressly describe a remedy).
138. Gundlach, 924 F. Supp. at 692.
139. 856 F.Supp. 40 (D. N.H. 1994).
140. See id. at 44-45. This case involved a parent who claimed her rights under FERPA
were violated when she was denied access to educational records of her son. Id. at 40-41. The
court followed a theory of the First Circuit that stated even though Suter provided some new
insight on how to handle § 1983 actions based on violations of federal statutes, it was not
necessary to kill the ideas of Wilder, and the wise way to proceed would be to try to meld the
Suter decision with the Court's prior precedents. Id.
141. See id. at 44-45.
142. Id. at 46.
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determine whether the obligations imposed on the institutions was a
mandatory requirement rather than a mere congressional preference.143 As
the court found FERPA imposed obligations that were mandatory re-
quirements, the court proceeded to answer the questions raised under the
Wilder test.144 The combination of the Suter test, which is similar to the
implied right of action test, and the Wilder test does not seem to be what the
Supreme Court would have intended. 45 To prevent more conflict between
the lower courts, and to clarify its previous decisions about § 1983 actions
for violations of federal spending statutes, the Court granted certiorari in
Gonzaga University v. John Doe. 146
III. ANALYSIS
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for Gonzaga, which
held that a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action to enforce provisions of
FERPA relating to the policy or practice of releasing educational records to
unauthorized persons.147 The majority determined that FERPA did not cre-
ate personal rights that one could enforce under § 1983.148 Justice Souter
joined with Justice Breyer to concur in the opinion, but disagreed in part
with the method the majority used to conclude that no personal rights that
were enforceable under § 1983 were created in FERPA.149 In a dissent
joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Stevens argued that the language of
FERPA did create enforceable rights under a § 1983 action, and accused the
majority of now requiring congressional intent to specifically confer an
enforceable right under § 1983, as opposed to specifically intending to
confer just a federal right. 150
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court recognized that Congress enacted FERPA under its spending
power to condition educational institutions and agencies receipt of federal
funds on certain "requirements relating to the access and disclosure of
143. Id. at 46. The creation of two questions to determine if the Suter test was met came
from the First Circuit's interpretation of how to apply Suter. Id. at 44-46.
144. Id. at 47. The court found that FERPA did create enforceable rights within the meaning
of § 1983 as it met all the requirements of the Wilder test. Id.
145. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990); see also Suter v. Artist
M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992).
146. Gonzaga Univ.v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 317-18, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002).
147. Id. at 2271. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the majority
opinion.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2279.
150. Id. at 2280-84.
[VOL. 79:953
2003] CASE COMMENT
student educational records."151 The Court also recognized that in
Thiboutot the Court allowed § 1983 actions to be brought against state
actors to enforce rights created by federal statutes.152 A quick historical
tour of the Court's cases that dealt with § 1983 actions to enforce private
rights created by federal statutes was taken to emphasize some of the most
important holdings in those cases. 153 The Court noted that there had been
only two times where it found spending legislation that had created en-
forceable rights.154 In its most recent decisions, however, the Court had
denied any attempt to show enforceable rights from spending clause
legislation.155 The Court took this tour through its past § 1983 cases to
show that the John Doe court, and other lower courts, had misinterpreted
these cases when they determined the standard for finding enforceable
rights by § 1983.156
The Court emphasized that its opinions should be read to purport that
only an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983.157
Statutes that create benefits or interests that are conferred to a particular
group of plaintiffs do not give rise to § 1983 actions.158 The mistake of
trying to enforce benefits instead of rights would not occur, according to the
Court, if the Court's implied right of action cases would be used as a guide
to determine whether a statute confers rights that would be enforceable
under § 1983.159 There was an overlap of implied right of action cases and
151. Id. at 2272-73.
152. Id. at 2273.
153. Id. at 2273-75. The Court mentioned that in Pennhurst the Court did not find that the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights conferred enforceable rights as the Court
did not consider Congress expressed an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights. See id. at
2273. Pennhurst, however, was decided as an implied right of action case as opposed to a § 1983
action case. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. V. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
154. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. at 273-74, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2273 (2002). The two cases
where enforceable rights were created were Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987), and Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
155. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 2274. The two most recent cases that the
Court refers to are Suter v. Artist M. 503 U.S. 347 (1992), and Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329
(1997).
156. Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280-81, 122 S.Ct. at 2274. John Doe had argued that there
was a difference between a § 1983 action and an implied cause of action. Respondent's Brief at
40-43, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002) (No. 01-679).
157. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 282-83, 122 S.Ct. at 2275.
158. Id. The Court concluded that the three-prong test in Blessing was being misread to
allow benefits or interests to give rise to § 1983 actions, as those relying on that case did not take
into account other language in Blessing that emphasized that only violations of rights, not laws,
give rise to § 1983 actions. Id.
159. Id. The majority noted that the failure to use implied right of action cases as a guide
was done in Wilder, but not in Suter, and Pennhurst. Id. In fact, the Court in Wilder specifically
argued against treating § 1983 classes similarly to implied right of action cases, noting that they
were different types of actions. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990).
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those trying to enforce rights under § 1983, because in each type of action
one must "determine whether Congress intended to create a federal
right."160 Therefore, the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case
and a § 1983 action are the same. 161
The Court stated that requiring the same inquiry for § 1983 actions as
implied right of action cases created a situation where Congress must use
clear and unambiguous terms to create new rights under § 1983.162 A
statute would be enforceable only where "Congress explicitly conferred a
right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case." 163
The Court determined that the question would not be whether anyone would
benefit or whether an interest was created for a particular person, but whe-
ther Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries of
the statute.164 There would be no basis for a private suit under § 1983 if the
text and structure of a statute did not indicate that Congress intended to
create new individual rights.165
The Court then examined the text of the pertinent provisions of FERPA
to determine if Congress had conferred an enforceable right in clear and
unambiguous terms. 166 The Court found that FERPA failed to create en-
forceable rights, as it lacked the "rights creating" language that was crucial
to show the necessary congressional intent to create new rights.167 Since
the language in FERPA spoke about the Secretary of Education not al-
lowing funds to be authorized for violating FERPA, the Court concluded
that there was no grant of individual entitlement that would be enforceable
under § 1983.168 Also, the provisions of FERPA "speak only in terms of
institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of disclosure."169
The Court found this aggregate focus not to be on whether a particular
person's needs had been satisfied, and therefore would not create rights for
160. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. at 2275. Plaintiffs suing under § 1983, unlike
those suing under an implied right of action, would not have the burden of showing that Congress
also intended to create a private remedy as § 1983 is presumed to supply the remedy. Id. at 2276.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2279 at 289-90.
163. Id. at 2276 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
164. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285-86, 122 S.Ct. at 2276-77.
165. Id. at 2277.
166. Id. at 2277-79.
167. Id. at 2277.
168. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2002). The Court compared FERPA's language
authorizing the Secretary of Education to act to the terminology found in Titles VI and IX, which
contain language so as, "no person shall be subjected to discrimination," and determined the focus
is two steps removed from the parents and students who may claim a right was created. Gonzaga,
536 U.S. at 286, 122 S.Ct. at 2277.
169. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288, 122 S.Ct. at 2278.
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an individual.170 The Court also determined that the mechanism Congress
put in place to enforce FERPA supported the Court's assertion that the pro-
visions failed to grant enforceable rights under § 1983.171 FERPA
expressly called for the Secretary of Education to "deal with the violations"
of the Act.172 In accordance with these enforcement provisions, the
Secretary established an office that acted as a review board and enforced
FERPA.173 The Court asserted that these sorts of administrative procedures
were evidence of a federal review mechanism that indicated the lack of
congressional intent to create individually enforceable private rights. 174
After holding that FERPA did not create enforceable rights under
§ 1983, the Court explained how to determine if a federal statute has created
rights that are enforceable. 75 The Court stated that "if Congress wishes to
create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and
unambiguous terms-no less and no more than what is required for Congress
to create new rights enforceable under an implied right of action." 176 The
correct test to apply to determine whether a statutory provision has given
rise to a federal right is the Suter test, not the three-prong test of Wilder.177
The language of a federal statute must unambiguously confer an en-
forceable right upon the Act's beneficiaries in order to support a cause of
action brought under § 1983.178 Therefore, the Wilder three-prong test is no
longer relevant when determining if an enforceable right under § 1983 is
created in FERPA.179
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that whether one may bring a
§ 1983 action to enforce a federal statute is ultimately a question of con-
gressional intent. 180 However, since there is so much diversity in statutes
for a single test to be absolutely controlling, Justice Breyer would not "pre-
170. Id. An example of this sort of language is shown when an institution has violated
FERPA if it has a policy or practice of releasing educational records. Id.
171. Id. at 2278.
172. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f).
173. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at _, 122 S.Ct. at 2278-79.
174. Id. at 2279. The Court also determined that since FERPA required the Secretary not to
carry out the functions of the Act in any of the Department of Education's regional offices to
avoid multiple interpretations of the Act, the Court could not believe Congress intended to have
private suits brought before hundreds of federal and state judges around the country. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2275.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2279 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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determine an outcome through the use of a presumption-such as the
majority's presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth
'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and structure."' 181 Justice Breyer,
despite not agreeing with the majority's presumption, did not believe
Congress intended to create private judicial actions to enforce FERPA's
privacy provisions.182
Justice Breyer agreed that the majority correctly identified certain areas
of FERPA's provisions that do not indicate an intent on behalf of Congress
to create an enforceable right or rights. 83 The fact that much of the
language in FERPA was "broad and nonspecific" indicated to Justice
Breyer that Congress did not intend to create enforceable rights because
language that is not specific leaves states, or in this case educational in-
stitutions, in a position where they are not certain of the actual restrictions
upon them.184 As Justices Souter and Breyer did not agree with the
majority's decision to apply the Suter test, there was only a five to four
majority that ruled that the Suter test was the correct test to apply when
determining whether a federal statute had created enforceable rights within
the meaning of § 1983.185
C. JUSTICE STEVEN'S DISSENT
Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justice Ginsberg, claimed that
FERPA did create federal rights and questioned the majority's creation of
what he called "a new category of second-class statutory rights."186 Justice
Stevens looked at the text and title of FERPA (Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act), and he determined enforceable rights were indeed created
by this language. 87 Justice Stevens acknowledged that the language in the
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2279-80.
183. Id. at 2280. Breyer points to the lack of any reference in the provisions to individual
rights, and that the statute seems to indicate federal enforcement not on an individual level, but
rather on the national level. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2279. Despite arguing that the Suter test should not apply, Breyer does not
specifically endorse the three-prong Wilder test. Id. Breyer does recognize that the three-prong
test has been helpful in determining the intent of Congress, but he purports that no single test
should be followed in every single § 1983 case. Id.
186. Id. at 2280 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2281. Justice Stevens found many examples of rights-creating language
throughout FERPA. Id. Section (a)(l)(A) of FERPA gives parents "the right to inspect and
review the education records of their children." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (2002). Section
(a)(1)(D) provides that a student may waive "his right of access." Subsection (d) provides that
after a student reaches the age of eighteen, "the rights accorded to the ... student" shall then be
passed from the parent to the child. Justice Stevens even mentioned that the name of the act,
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provision of FERPA relevant in this case (§ 1232g(b)) was not as explicit as
other portions of FERPA, but he determined the language in § 1232g(b) did
formulate an individual right. 8 8 The provision met the standards of the
three-prong test, created in Wilder, which was used to articulate what was
required to create a federal right in Blessing.'8 9 Justice Stevens determined
section 1232g(b) of FERPA passed the three-prong test because: "It is
directed to the benefit of individual students and parents; the provision is
binding on States as it is couched in mandatory, rather than precatory terms;
and the right is far from vague and amorphous."190
Justice Stevens also disagreed with the majority's view that because
FERPA speaks about policies and practices it has an aggregate focus that
prevents the statute from forming individual rights.191 Section 1232g(b)
does not ban policies or practices; instead it allows policies or practices, "so
long as 'there is written consent from the student's parents specifying re-
cords to be released." 92 Justice Stevens would therefore find that although
policies are mentioned, they are dependent upon an individual's actions of
giving consent, which focuses on an individual rather than on policies or
practices.193 Having found that FERPA met the standards of the three-
prong test, Justice Stevens would then ask whether Congress had expressly
forbidden a § 1983 action in the statute itself.194 As FERPA does not
provide any guaranteed access to federal judicial review or formal ad-
ministrative hearings, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress had not
foreclosed enforcement under § 1983 by providing enforcement me-
chanisms that were comprehensive and incompatible with § 1983 actions. 195
Justice Stevens then disputed the majority's finding that the test for
determining if a federal right was created by statute should be the same for
"Education Rights," indicated that Congress intended to have created enforceable rights. Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, _, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2281 (2002).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-341 (1997).
190. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. at 295, 122 S.Ct. at 2281 (quoting Blessing v.
Freestone 520 U.S. 329, 344 (1997)). Stevens went on to state the provision in FERPA is even
more specific and clear than rights that had been found in earlier cases such as Wright and Wilder.
Id. at 2281-82.
191. Id. at 2282.
192. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(A)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2282-83. This question of whether Congress expressly forbid a § 1983 action is
the second factor that would not allow one to bring a § 1983 action according to the Court in
Pennhurst. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981).
195. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 297, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2283 (2002).
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§ 1983 cases as for implied right of action cases. 196 Justice Stevens argued
that the Court had made a distinction between the two types of cases in
Wilder.197 In Wilder, the Court recognized that an implied right of action
may be brought only where Congress intended to create a private remedy
for the violation of statutory rights. 98 A § 1983 action, albeit a statutory
form of relief created by Congress, provides an alternative method of
bringing private suits for statutory violations when courts find that Con-
gress has not foreclosed that option.199 Justice Stevens argued that the
ruling by the majority to require § 1983 cases to use the same test as im-
plied right of action cases would overrule both Wright and Wilder, as those
cases "concluded that the statutes at issue created rights enforceable under §
1983, but the statutes did not 'clearly and unambiguously' intend
enforceability under § 1983."200
Justice Stevens argued that since implied right of action cases have
never clearly distinguished between finding if a cause of action exists and
finding whether there is a right that is enforceable, the majority appeared to
have said that what is now required for a § 1983 action is "congressional
intent specifically to make the right enforceable under § 1983."201 If that
was not what the majority was implying, and the majority was simply
saying that in both situations, § 1983 cases and implied right of action
cases, one must determine if the statute created an enforceable right, then
why was there a need for a new test?20 2 Justice Stevens claimed that the
test required by the majority created a group of second-class rights, which
were rights that had presumptive enforceability under § 1983.203 They are
second-class rights when compared "to a right whose enforcement Congress
has clearly intended," which are now the only rights the majority would
recognize as being enforceable under § 1983.204
196. Id. at 2284. Justice Stevens noted that since FERPA was enacted, all of the federal
courts of appeals have concluded that rights enforceable under § 1983 were created by FERPA,
and most federal and state courts have agreed with the decision reached by the circuit courts. Id.
at 299, n.6.
197. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990).
198. Id.
199. Id. This concern was grounded in the principle of separation of powers. Id.
200. Gonazga, 536 U.S. at 300, n.8.
201. Id. at 301.
202. Id. at 302.





The decision reached by the Court in Gonzaga will have an immediate
effect on people seeking remedies under FERPA, and the decision will
greatly limit the ability of people to bring a § 1983 action for violations of
federal law. Shortly after the Court's decision in Gonzaga, a law professor,
discussing the decision, stated that:
It's [the holding in Gonzaga] ultimately about the structure of how
certain rights are going to be enforced. This ruling basically will affect a
whole host of laws that protect privacy or federal laws that protect a variety
of different interests. It makes it a lot harder for people to bring private
causes of action not just for FERPA, but for a whole host of federal laws" 205
All § 1983 cases that are brought as a result of violations of federal law
will be affected by the Court's requirement that an enforceable right in a
§ 1983 action must be determined by the test used to find an enforceable
right in an implied right of action case.206
The Gonzaga decision has already had an impact on § 1983 claims in
federal courts around the country. 207 In Briand v. Lavigne,20 8 a district
court in Maine had to determine if a federal statute, which protected against
the disclosure of people's records in substance abuse counseling, created an
enforceable ight under § 1983.209 The court, in making its determination
that Congress did not provide privately enforceable rights under the statute
involved, relied extensively on Gonzaga.2 10 The court used implied right of
action cases as a guide for determining if an enforceable right under § 1983
was created. 21' Therefore, the court looked at the text of the statute and
determined that, just as in FERPA, the language of the statute did not
contain express rights-creating language.2 12
205. Interview by Liane Hansen with Daniel Solove, Professor of Law, Seton Hall
University, (June 20, 2002), 2002 WL 3496726.
206. See Briand v. Lavigne, 223 F.Supp.2d 241 (D. MA 2002) (§ 1983 action based on
violations allegedly committed by a parole officer); see also Henry's Wrecker Serv. Co. of Fairfax
County Inc. v. Prince George's County, 2002 WL 1953824 (D. MD.) (§ 1983 claim based on
alleged violations of the plaintiff's rights under Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act).
207. See Henry's Wrecker Serv., 2002 WL 1953824; see also Briand, 223 F. Supp.2d at 241.
208. Briand v. Lavigne, 223 F. Supp.2d 241 (D. MA 2002).
209. Briand, 223 F. Supp.2d at 243-245; see also 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2002) (providing that
records of people in substance abuse counseling may only be disclosed in the manner provided by
the statute). Title 42 contained statements that purported to give individuals who were admitted to
a program to receive mental health services, a bill of rights. Id. at 245.
210. Id. at 244-246.
211. Id.
212. Id. The Maine court found that the statute in question was not focused on individuals,
but rather on those people who keep the medical records, just as the Court in Gonzaga determined
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In Almendares v. Palmer,213 the court indicated that the Wilder three-
prong test was no longer to be followed as a result of the decision in
Gonzaga.214 The federal Food Stamp Act (FSA) requires that state agencies
have appropriate bilingual personnel and printed materials in those areas of
the state where a substantial number of those who would receive food
stamps speak a language other than English. 215 The plaintiffs in Almedares,
low income Spanish-speaking recipients of food stamps, brought a § 1983
action against the administrators of the food stamps, because the recipients
believed their right to bilingual information had been deprived. 2i6 The
court rejected the three-prong test from Wilder and chose to follow the
method employed in Gonzaga to determine if the FSA created an
enforceable right under § 1983.217 The court looked at the text and
structure of the FSA and determined that the Act did not contain express
rights-creating language, which would give rise to an enforceable right
under § 1983.218 The court did not elaborate in great detail as to why the
FSA did not create an enforceable right under § 1983 except by saying that
the FSA was similar, in the language used by Congress, to FERPA, which
the Supreme Court found did not have rights-creating language. 219 As a
result of the decision in Gonzaga, Congress must use explicit right-or-duty-
creating language in order for one to have an enforceable right under
§ 1983.220 Without clear unambiguous language by Congress to create a
private right of action, the courts, as a result of Gonzaga, will not "impute
to Congress an intent to create a private right of action." 221
The Gonzaga decision's effect on FERPA will be the unavailability of
§ 1983 to enforce FERPA provisions. 222 Without the ability to bring § 1983
actions for violations of FERPA, the only way to remedy violations is
that FERPA focused on the educational institutions that cared for student records, and not the
students. Id.
213. No. 3:00-CV-7524 2002 WL 31730963 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002).
214. Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00-CV-7524 2002 WL 31730963 at 4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3,
2002). The court refers to the test in Blessing, but that test is the test that originated in Wilder.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1.
217. Id. at 4-5.
218. Id.
219. Id. The court did not believe the FSA contained rights-creating language as the Act
simply imposed conditions on those who received federal funds. Id. The court also determined
that the FSA had an "aggregate" focus rather than a focus on individual needs of any particular
person. Id. at 5. At no point did the court look beyond the language of the FSA to the purpose or
intent of Congress in requiring bilingual personnel or materials for those persons receiving
benefits under the FSA who did not speak English. Id. at 1-8.
220. Id. at 4 n.2.
221. Id. (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2276 n. 3 (2002)).
222. Theuman, supra note 34, at § 14(b).
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through the enforcement mechanisms within FERPA itself.223 Currently,
the Department of Education states that a school must "have a parent's
consent prior to the disclosure of education records." 224 Although this
sounds like a fairly good assurance that a student's education record is not
likely to end up in the "wrong" person's hands, an individual can no longer
bring a § 1983 action to obtain damages if an educational institution
discloses a student's educational record, to that student's detriment, in
violation of FERPA.225
FERPA's enforcement mechanisms do not provide any remedy to a
student or parent who has been harmed by an educational institution's
violation of FERPA. A former student at the University of New Hampshire
now knows this reality well. 226 The student, while attending the University
of New Hampshire, claimed she was physically assaulted by her
research/academic advisor, and during the criminal trial of this advisor, her
GRE scores were announced to the court by the counsel for the defense in
an effort to prove she was a bad student as reflected by the GRE scores.
227
The university admitted, as the student claimed, that the student had not
given consent that her GRE scores be released to any unauthorized third
persons.228 The advisor had given the scores to his lawyer, which led to the
student filing a claim with the Department of Education that the university
had violated the disclosure provision of FERPA.229 Despite having her
private test scores announced in court and used to show she was not a good
student, the Department of Education's response to the university was that
it wanted "assurance and evidence that the university has informed
appropriate officials of FERPA's prior written consent requirement for
disclosure of education records." 230 In contrast, John Doe in Gonzaga, who
was able to bring a § 1983 action for a violation of his rights under FERPA,
was awarded a jury verdict of $450,000.231 FERPA itself contains no
provisions that allow the Secretary of Education to grant any form of relief
223. Gonzaga Univ. v Doe, 536 U.S. 273, _, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2278-79 (2002).
224. FERPA General Guidance for Parents, at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OM/fpco/ferpa/parents.html (last visited Oct. 5th, 2002).
225. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at , 122 S.Ct. at 2278-2279; see also Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of
Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2nd Cir. 2002) (finding that FERPA does not create a right enforceable
under § 1983 for a natural parent to gain access to her child's educational records).
226. Letter from LeRoy S. Booker, Director of Family Policy Compliance Office, to Dr.






231. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 277, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002).
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to a student or parent who may have been injured as a result of an
educational institution's violation of FERPA.232
Some may claim that allowing people to recover under § 1983 actions
for violations of FERPA are not necessary, as many of these § 1983 claims,
just as in Gonzaga, are one of many claims that include such torts as
defamation and invasion of privacy. 233 The Supreme Court, however, ad-
dressed this issue when it responded to an argument in Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth. that some sort of state court
remedy could instead enforce a § 1983 claim under a violation of the
Housing Act.234 The Court recognized that although a state-remedy may
exist, there is no reason to bar a § 1983 action, "which was adopted to
provide a federal remedy for the enforcement of federal rights." 235
Overall, the adoption of the new Gonzaga test to determine whether a
federal statute gives rise to enforceable rights within the meaning of § 1983,
may require Congress to be more diligent when creating and enacting
spending legislation. 236 The Court in Gonzaga insisted that, "if Congress
wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear
and unambiguous terms - no less and no more than what is required for
Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of
action." 237 The Court also stated that in order for rights to be created that
are enforceable under a § 1983 action, the provisions of the statutes must
contain rights-creating language. 238 Congress clearly has the responsibility
to determine whether rights that are enforceable under a § 1983 action exist
in the legislation it enacts.239
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe held that the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) would not support a cause of
action under § 1983.240 Cases brought under § 1983 actions to enforce
232. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.66 (2002).
233. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390, 396 (Wash. 2001).
234. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U. S. 418, 429 (1987).
235. Id.
236. See Taylor v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 783-784 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding
that under Gonzaga, a court must now look to see if the language used by Congress
unambiguously confers an enforceable right under § 1983, as opposed to trying to determine if
Congress had foreclosed an action under § 1983).
237. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 2279 (2002).
238. Id. at 2277.
239. See Niziol v. Dist. Sch. Bd. Of Pasco County, 240 F.Supp.2d 1194, 1201 (M.D. Fla
2002) (following Gonzaga by finding no basis for a private suit unless a statute provides an




private rights that are created by federal laws will not be successful unless
Congress has unambiguously conferred such a right to the plaintiff in such
an action. 241 The Court's decisions in implied right of action cases should
be used as guide to determine if Congress intended to create rights that are
enforceable within the meaning of § 1983.242 Congress must use rights-
creating language to express, in clear and unambiguous terms, that it
intended to create rights that are enforceable under § 1983.243 The Court
determined that since FERPA did not have such express rights-creating
language, one could not bring a § 1983 action to enforce violations of
FERPA, despite the number of injuries that the violations may have
caused. 244 The Gonzaga decision seems to have taken away, to a large
degree, the ability of courts to enforce the federally authorized ability of an
individual to seek a private remedy for a violation of his rights that are
protected under federal law.
Stephen A. Bott
241. Id. at 283.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 290.
244. Id.
2003]

